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THE AMERICAN-EASTERN APPLICATION: CRUCIAL
TEST OF CAB MERGER POLICY
The railman's cry bf "merge or die" may soon become the watchword
of the air transport industry. Even though airlines are subject to detailed
regulation-to implement safety as well as economic objectives-, including
limitations on entry,' price regulation, and in certain cases, federal sub-
sidy,2 competition is permitted "to the extent necessary" to ensure a healthy
air transport system "adapted to the needs" of commerce, the postal serv-
ice, and national defense.3 The United States maintains the world's only
competitive airline system, and individual airlines are complaining not
about regulation but about regulated competition. 4 In most major markets,
there are at least two trunk airlines competing for supremacy and survival,
and although the public has benefited from this competition in long-haul
markets, service has deteriorated in shoit-haul and intermediate markets
as long-haul equipment has become increasingly unsuited for short trips.5
Indeed, the advent of the jet age has set off an equipment race "unparalleled
in any transportation system and unlikely to be duplicated." 6 Gains in
net income have not kept pace with increases in gross traffic and revenue,
and competition from other forms of transportation, particularly the auto-
mobile, has become increasingly effective. 7 Because of the effects of the
present degree of competition, the problems of equipment financing and low
earnings, and the prospect that supersonic transport may magnify these
difficulties, both the airlines ard the Civil Aetonautics Board have been
considering merger as a possible solution.3
The most recent merger application-that of American and E~tei-n
Aiifiesi the second and fourth largest air carriers in the United States-
is in many ways unprecedented. It presents a crucial test of CAB policy
I See generally Maclay & Burt, Entry of New Carriers into Domestic Trunkline
Air Transportation, 22 J. Am L. & Cok. 131 (1955).
2 See Baines, Airline Subsidies-Purpose, Cause and Control, 26 J. AIR L. & Com.
311, 321 (1959); Hale & Hale, Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. PA.
L. Rav. 311, 358 (1961) (subsidy tends to remove "both the carrot and the stick
often thought necessary to goad competitors into action").
3 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958);
see Berge, Compeiition to the Extent Necessary: An Historical Introduction, 22
3. AIR L. & Coa. 127, 130 (1955).
4 See Tipton & GeVirtz, The Effect of Regulated Competition on the Air Tran.s-
port Industry, 22 J. Am L & Com. 157, 158 (1955).
5 Barnes, supra note 2, at 321.
6 Ibid.
7 See Tipton & Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 158, i75.
8 See, e.g., Addresses by CAB Chairman Boyd, Economic Club of Detroit,
Jan. 8, 1962, and Aero Club of Washington, D.C., Feb. 18, 1961.
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and may significantly alter the future structure of the airline industry. The
desirability, probability, and ultimate impact of approval of the proposed
merger can best be evaluated in the context of past CAB merger decisions.
I. DETERMINANTS OF CAB MERGER POLICY
A. Statutory Standards
Section 7 of the Clayton Act bans mergers whose effect "may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 9 But
under section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act, Board approval immunizes
an airline merger from attack under the antitrust laws. 10 And section
408(b) of the act directs the Board to approve a merger unless it is in-
consistent with the public interest policies enumerated in section 102: "1
(a) The encouragement and development of an air transportation
system properly adapted to the present and future needs of the
foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the National defense;
(b) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to
recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the
highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions
in, such transportation, and to improve the relations between, and
coordinate transportation by, air carriers;
(c) The promotion of adequate, economical, and efficient service
by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discrimina-
tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive
competitive practices;
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to
the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense;
(e) The promotion of safety in air commerce; and
(f) The promotion, encouragement, and development of civil
aeronautics.
However, section 408(b) also contains the proviso that a merger shall
not be approved if it would result in monopoly and thereby restrain com-
938 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
10 The Justice Department may, however, intervene in the Board proceeding
and, indeed, has done so in the American-Eastern Merger Case, petition filed, No.
13355, CAB, Feb. 20, 1962.
"72 Stat. 740 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958). See, e.g., American Airlines,
Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 365, 371-72
(1946); Pan-American Airways, Inc., 2 C.A.B. 503, 505 (1940).
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petition or jeopardize another air carrier. The Board has interpreted
monopoly as "a particular degree of control of air transportation" rather
than a general tendency to stifle competition and control prices,' 2 and
restraint of competition and jeopardy to another carrier have been grounds
for rejection only when caused by monopoly.13
To the extent that it requires merger approval "unless" certain findings
are made, the Federal Aviation Act is unique among regulatory statutes.
According to a recent Senate Commerce Committee report, the phrasing
of the statute "indicates some intent by Congress to favor mergers, where
possible." 24 Air mergers, therefore, are judged by the policies of the
antitrust laws only to the extent that those policies are subsumed in the
public interest criteria of section 102.15
B. Changing Views Toward Competition
In the early forties, the "Big Four"-United, American, TWA, and
Eastern-had established their position of industry dominance and com-
peted for traffic on the high density routes. However, competition was
generally lacking, and many local and area monopolies existed.' 6  The
12 See, e.g., United Air Lines Transport Corp., Acquisition of Western Air
Express Corp., 1 C.A.A. 723, 732-34 (1940).
13 See id. at 737. It has been suggested that with this construction the Board
has read the monopoly proviso out of the statute. Comment, 62 CoLum. L. REv.
851, 853 (1962). Of course these factors-restraint of competition and jeopardy to
another carrier--are still taken into account as elements of "public interest." See
note 11 supra and accompanying text.
14 S. REP. No. 445, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 701 (1961). Every merger involves
transfer of a certificate. Section 401 requires an affirmative finding of public
interest before a certificate transfer is approved; this section should not, however,
alter the merger provision and, in fact, it has been held not to affect the determina-
tion of public interest for merger purposes. See, e.g., Acquisition of Mayflower
Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 680, 681 (1944); Comment, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 851, 862,
n.94 (1962).
'I Cf. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1944) (in-
terpreting the antitrust immunity of the Interstate Commerce Act). See generally
FULDA, CoMPE'rTIoN IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION (1961); Hale
& Hale, Competition or Control IV: Air Carriers, 109 U. PA. L. REv, 311 (1961) ;
Hale & Hale, Competition or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regu-
lated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 46 (1962); Schwartz, Legal Restriction of
Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility,
67 HARv. L. REv. 436 (1954). Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in McLean, supra
at 93-94, suggested that mergers be approved only upon a finding that the policy of
the Transportation Act would otherwise be thwarted. Professor Louis B. Schwartz
has proposed the following congressional resolution:
It is the policy of the United States that no arrangement involving exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws shall be approved unless the approving agency
finds that it is impractical to carry out the aims of regulation in a manner
more consistent with antitrust objectives.
Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 22, pt. 1, vol. 1, at 91 (1957). According to CAB counsel
and the Justice Department, however, the Board has adopted the rationale of the
dissent in McLean that antitrust laws must be considered. See Brief of Bureau of
Economic Regulation, pp. 45-47, Brief of United States, p. 17, American-Eastern
Merger Case, No. 13355, CAB, July 31, 1962.
16Taaffe, Map Analysis of U.S. Airline Competition, 25 J. AIR L. & Com. 121,
125-29 (1958).
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Board adopted and has maintained a somewhat vague policy of discourag-
ing expansion of the large carriers and encouraging the small and medium-
size carriers to merge into larger and fewer systems.' 7 A qualified presump-
tion in favor of competition '8 was established except as to local service,
or "feeder" lines which had limited traffic potential. 19 In 1945, the Board
enthusiastically endorsed airline competition:
The greatest gain from competition, whether actual or potential,
is the stimulus to devise and experiment with new operating tech-
niques and new equipment, to develop new means of acquiring
and promoting business, including the rendering of better service
to the country, and to afford the Government comparative yard-
sticks by which the performance of the United States operators
can be measured. . . . No effective substitute for healthy com-
petition as a stimulus to progress and efficiency can be found in
monopoly. The stimulus to an imaginative management that
results from the competitive efforts of business rivals to secure
patronage and trade cannot be matched as a motivating force for
the public welfare even by the private profit incentive, for the
latter might be satisfied with moderate traffic at high rates while
public welfare would require mass transportation at lower fares
and charges. The improvements which flow from a competitive
service cannot be decreed by administrative fiatY0
The following year the Board refined its concept of competition to a
"regulated competition which seeks to avoid the stifling influence of
monopoly on the one hand and the economic anarchism of unrestrained
competition on the other." 
2 1
In the late forties, although the regional carriers were becoming com-
petitive with the Big Four, the Board did little to promote competition, for
its primary concern was the termination of subsidies. From 1948 through
1955, earnings, profits, and traffic rose steadily while the degree of com-
petition remained essentially static-more than half the major air routes
were served on a monopoly basis. Trunklines were no longer being sub-
sidized, and air traffic increased enormously during the Korean War
period.2 To heighten competitive pressure on the Big Four and strengthen
17 See Bluestone, The Problem of Competition Among Domestic Trunk Airlines,
21 J. AIR L. & Com. 50, 79 (1954).
18 See TWA North-South California Service Case, 4 C.A.B. 373 (1943) ; Braniff
Airways, 2 C.A.B. 353, 386 (1940) ; Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in U.S.
Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 24 J. Am L. & Com.
410, 421 (1957).
19 See id. at 419.
20 Northeast Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319, 325-26
(1945).
21 IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639, 643-44 (1946).




weaker carriers, the Board awarded new routes.P Since price competition
was minimized by rate regulation, the airlines pursued product differentia-
tion by emphasizing scheduling, equipment, and in-flight and ground serv-
ices 24 In the past few years, competitive scheduling on parallel flights
has produced significant overcapacity, and jet re-equipping has imposed a
heavy debt on the industry, with the result that Board Chairman Boyd has
repedtedly suggested that "a series of mergers or consolidations might be
beneficial to the trunkline industry and in the public interest." 25
II. A CASE ANALYSIS OF AIR MERGER HISTORY
A. "Public Interest" Criteria
Past merger applications have been approved only upon satisfaction of
four basic "public interest" criteria which the Board has refined from the
general policies enumeiated in section 102: the effect of merger on the
applying parties, on employment, on other carriers, ;nd on the "system."
1. Effect on Applying Parties
Ordinarily the CAB first considers the terms of a merger agreement.
In particular, the purchase price must be reasonable according to the
acquiring airline's ability to pay and the value of the property to be trans-
ferred.V 6  An unreasonable price may deplete the purchaser's assets and
result in an impairment of service or an imposition of subsidy burden on
the public 2 7  In 1946, the Board refused to permit Braniff Airways to
absorb a Mexican carrier on the ground that unprofitable routes to Mexico
would cause a financial drain on Braniff and impair its ability to obtain
needed capital and adequately respond to the swiftly changing require-
ments of air transportation. 8 In an earlier acquisition case, the Board
23 See Taaffe, supra note 16, at 132-37; Trial Brief of American Airlines, Inc.
and Eastern Air Lines, Inc., p. 10, American-Eastern Merger Case, No. 13355, CAB,
May 7, 1962. See also Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52, 56 (1955),
supplemental opinion, 23 C.A.B. 42 (1956): "It is vital . . . to so develop the
national air route structure as to tend to decrease rather than increase the gap
between the relative size of the Big Four carriers and the smaller trunks."
24 See Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in U.S. Domestic Air Transpor-
tation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 25 J, Am L. & Coax. 148, 155 (1958).
25 See, e.g., Addresses by CAB Chairman Boyd, Aero Club of Washington, D.C.,
Feb. 28, 1961, p. 3, and Connecticut General Symposium, Hartford, Conn., Nov. 3,
1961, p. 6.
26 See Zook, Recasting the Air Route Pattern by Airline Consolidations and
Mergers, 21 J. Am L. & Coax. 293, 300 (1954). The Board also seeks to prevent
increases in mail-pay rate bases due to merger valuations. Id. at 305. Evidence of
arm's-length negotiations is usually accepted by the Board as prima fade indication
of a fair and reasonable price. See, e.g., United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier
Property, 8 C.A.B. 298, 314 (1947), amended, 11 C.A.B. 701 (1950), modified mb
nain. Western Air Lines v. C.A.B., 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1952).
27 See National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control Case, 6 C.A.B. 671, 677-79, 682
(1946); Acquisition of Marquette Airlines by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1, supplemental
opinions, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940), 3 C.A.B. 111 (1941).
28 Braniff Airways, Inc., Acquisition of Aerovias Braniff, S.A., 6 C.A.B. 947,
956-59 (1946).
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invalidated a "good will" valuation because the purchase price was fifteen
times the value of the tangible property to be transferred and the good
will was found to be practically worthless. This merger was eventually
approved at a lower purchase price which accounted for the "extremely
high traffic potential" of the acquired route; the Board recognized that
operating rights could be more valuable to a purchaser than to the seller
and found that the proposed price would not unduly burden either party.2
In evaluating the parties' need for merger, the Board has considered
a carrier's inherent route structure deficiencies, 0 individual inability to
obtain needed equipment, 31 protection of shareholder and creditor invest-
ments,32 and the prospect of operating economies, reduced unit costs,33
or improved services to one of the parties' routes. 4
2. Labor Protection
To forestall labor disputes which might delay or even prevent bene-
ficial mergers and to ensure that investors and the public do not benefit at
the employees' expense, the Board includes protective labor provisions in
most merger orders. Despite the absence of express statutory authority,
the CAB's power to impose such conditions has been upheld.3 5 At first,
the Board used the Burlington formula 36 for railroad abandonments as its
model for protective labor provisions, compensating employees for lost
salary resulting from furlough, termination of employment, and transfer to
lower-pay positions, as well as for moving and transportation expenses
incident to transfer to a new location.3 7  In the Braniff-Mid-Continent
Merger Case,38 however, the Board adopted a modified version of the
29 Acquisition of Marquette Airlines by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1, 14, supplemental
opinions, 2 C.A.B. 409, 413-14 (1940), 3- C.AB. 111 (1941).
30 See Eastern-Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B. 781, 784-86 (1954).
31 See id. at 785; Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647, 691
(1952).
3 2 See United-Capital Merger Case, IA Avo L. REP. j121-,132 (CAB, April 3,
1961), aff'd sub nom. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 303 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
33 See IYelta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647, 674, 694 (1952).
34 See Western Air Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Inland Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 654,
661 (1944).
35 Kent v. CAB, 204 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953).
See Zook, supra note 26, at 305-09. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §408(b),
72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1958), does provide for approval of mergers
"upon such terms and conditions as it finds to be just and reasonable and with such
modifications as it may prescribe .... .. " Compare Railway Labor Executives'
Ass'n v. United States, 339 U.S. 142 (1950); United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S.
225 (1939).
36 See Chicago B. & Q.R.R. Abandonment, 257 I.C.C. 700 (1944).
37 See generally Brown, Employee Protection and the Regulation of Public
Utilities: Mergers, Consolidations, and Abandonment of Facilities in the Transpor-
tation Industry, 63 YALE LJ. 445 (1954).
.3 15 C.A.B. 708, 710-19 (1952).
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Burlington formula that has since been used in many cases.39 It ordered
dismissal and displacement allowances, reimbursement for travel and mov-
ing expenses, integration of seniority lists, and arbitration of disputes,
but refused to hinge approval on a new labor-management agreement, for
then management would have to assent to every labor proposal or abandon
the merger. The Board may impose labor conditions retroactively if fore-
casts relied on at the hearing indicating that protective provisions will be
unnecessary, subsequently prove to have been incorrect.40
3. Effect on Other Carriers.
The Board normally examines a proposed merger to determine
whether it will cause excessive diversion from other carriers,4 although
the weight accorded this factor varies considerably. In its brief to the
Examiner in the American-Eastern case, American contends that the
impact on other carriers should not be controlling. "If a merger otherwise
makes sense and will contribute to the development of a rational air trans-
portation system, the adverse effect upon other carriers, which in all likeli-
hood will be minor and temporary, should not be allowed to stand in the
way of progress-any more than one carrrier should be able to prevent
a competitor from introducing an important technological improvement
in the industry." 4
There is, however, a statutory pronouncement directing the Board to
avoid destructive competition and maintain sound economic conditions.
4 3
And in considering the possibility of future destructive competition, it is
appropriate to examine the past competitive practices of the merging
parties. A Justice Department memorandum to the Examiner in American-
Eastern, citing the federal court practice in merger and related cases, argues
that evidence of past unfair competitive practices is relevant to determine
"whether a merging firm has a propensity to abuse its economic power." 4
Indeed, a history of business abuses is persuasive evidence that the applying
parties are not to be trusted with the magnified influence and power that
merger would afford.
39 See Brown, supra note 37, at 465-68. In Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case,
18 C.A.B. 326, 329 (1954), the Board emphasized that seniority disputes are best
settled through negotiated agreements and that other methods-arbitration, inte-
gration by Board action, and resolution by economic pressure-are, in that order,
less desirable.4 0 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298, 311 (1947),
amended, 11 C.A.B. 701, 707-11 (1950), modified sub nom. Western Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1952) (upholding Board's power to impose labor con-
ditions retroactively).
41 See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Control of Mid-Continent
Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 365, 378-79 (1946) ; Comment, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 851, 870-71
(1962).
42 Brief of American Airlines, Inc., p. 26, American-Eastern Merger Case, No.
13355, CAB, July 31, 1962.
43Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 102(b), (c), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C.
§§1302(b), (c) (1958).
44 Memorandum of United States, p. 2, American-Eastern Merger Case, No.
13355, CAB, Feb. 26, 1962.
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4. The "System"
The broadest factor, and the one most frequently articulated as being
determinative, has been the effect of a proposed merger on the national air
transport "system" and on proper "balance" in that system. This factor
requires an analysis of the level of competition, service to the public, in-
tegration of lines, and the general condition and structure of the industry-
in short, an analysis in terms of the policies dictated by section 102.
4
5
The Board has often formulated this public interest criterion in terms
of rationally integrated route patterns that will generate improved service
and economy of operation.46 Improved service resulting in increased
traffic is generally anticipated when a merger creates the possibility of
through-flight service instead of two-carrier connecting flights. 47 Yet the
principle of physical integration of operation and traffic flows has not been
uniformly applied. 4 8  In the National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control Case,
49
merger was denied, partly because no fusion of physical property in a con-
tiguous area and no development of an integrated system would have re-
suilted. Two years earlier, however, Western was permitted to acquire
Inland despite an obvious lack of geographical integration.-" In the first
feeder merger,5 1 an integrated system was one of three principal criteria
applied, but in the next case,52 the Board stated that complementary routes
were not essential to a merger of local service carriers.
In 1940, the Board announced that any merger which would retard
the development of an air transport system properly adapted to present
and future national needs "by stifling normal competition or by encourag-
ing destructive competition" must be deemed inconsistent with the public
interest.53 But generalities like "balanced system," "integration," and
"destructive competition" become meaningful only when traced through
a line of merger decisions which illustrate the Board's changing emphasis."
B. Merger Decisions Since 1940
1. Non-Trunkline 5 5 Mergers
Mergers of small, regional carriers are important not only because they
reveal developing theories of integration and regulated competition, but
45 See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
46 See Zook, supra note 26, at 295-96.
4 7 See, e.g., Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708, 728, 733-34
(1952) (Examiner's report).
48 See Bluestone, mspra note 17, at 80.
496 C.A.B. 671, 676 (1946).
50 See Western Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Inland Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 654 (1944).
51 Monarch-Challenger Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1949).
5 2 Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246, 247 (1950).
53 See United Air Lines Transport Corp., Acquisition of Western Air Express
Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739, 745 (1940).
54The Board's standards in merger cases are criticized in CAVEs, Ant TRANSPORT
AND ITs REGiULATORS 181 (1962).
55 The difference between trunkline and local service carriers is summarized in
Comment, 62 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 851, 866 n.116 (1962).
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also because of the possibility that earlier conceptions of regional systems
may eventually be applied to the national structure as distance* are con-
stantly diminished by technological advances.
a. The Alaska Paftert;
In Wien Alaska Airlines, Inc., Acqgfisition of Mirow Air Service
(1941),51 Wien was permitted to purchase an airline which its owner had
inherited but was unable to manage, Although Wie would become the
largest carrier in the Seward Peninsula area, the Board did not find
monopoly or destruction of "competitive balance" since competing carriers
were handling sufficient traffic, The Board was convinced that a unified
operation would produce improved public service through greater efficiency
and economy.
In Marine Airways-Alaska Transport, Consolidation (1942), 57 the
applicants served the same routes in southeastern Alaska with approxi-
mately equal facilities, traffic volume, and equally meager loads. Having
unsuccessfully tried facilities and personnel interchange, they applied for
merger. Approval was grounded on the proposition that parallel service is
economically unsound when traffic volume is insufficient to support it. The
possibility of eliminating uneconomical duplication without substantially
lessening competition made consolidation particularly desirable,
In 1944, the attempted acquisition of Cordova Air Service by Alaska
Airlines was halted because the merger would give Alaska Airlines an
overwhelming competitive advantage. Alaska had p.ready swallowed
three other carriers and was the biggest in the territory; it had penetrated
every major terminal except Cordova's route. The Board held the merger
inconsistent with the public interest since it would stifle the growth of a
balanced, competitive local system.85 Three years later, Wien Alaska
Airlines was permitted to acquire Ferguson to provide more direct service,
better equipment, safer operation, and a better development of traffic poten-
tial in the Hughes area,59  Competition was lessened only by a reduction
from five to four carriers between five points.6° Later that year, six
small carriers which had suffered equipment shortages and financing diffi-
culties on routes in southwest Alaska consolidated with Board approval
to form a strong system of integrated routes with better connections and
scheduling and more single-carrier service.68 The consolidated carrier
would not have a monopoly because it would compete with at least one of
three larger airlines at all points.
563 C.A.B. 207 (1941).
573 C.A.B, 31$ (1942).
0s Acquisition of Cordova Air Service, Inc., by Alaska Airlines, Inc., 4 C,AB,
708 (1944).
59 Acquisition of Ferguson Airways, Inc., by Wien Alaska Airlines, Inc., 7
C,A.B, 769 (1947).
00 Id. at 774.
61 Northern Consolidated Airlines, Jnc., 8 C.A.B. 110 (1947).
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b. Local Service Carriers
Shortly after World War II, the CAB certified local service carriers
on an experimental subsidy basis to serve communities smaller than those
receiving scheduled airline service from trunk carriers by "feeding" pas-
sengers into the long-haul routes; 62 it was anticipated that these carriers
would not be competitive with the trunklines. Thus, the first merger ap-
plication by feeders-Monarch-Challenger Merger Case (1949) -was
not approved until the Board was assured that trunkline traffic would not
be diverted. The Board's approval was also based on a finding that in-
tegration over the inter-mountain region between Salt Lake City and
Denver would be accompanied by a growth in inter-area traffic; that a
more strategic placing of pilots, better utilization of equipment, and re-
duction of personnel and facilities would cut operating expenses without
creating monopoly and would decrease the mail-pay subsidy requirement
for the combined system.64
In the next feeder merger case, the Board apparently abandoned the
integration requirement for local service carriers despite the dissent's
charge of an unwarranted departure from the feeder-experiment goal of
separate lines in separate areas. 65 The majority stated that a require-
ment of two complementary lines would recognize a necessity for local
operators to provide long-haul transportation. Actually, merger was prob-
ably approved because of a need for speedy activation of the acquired car-
r.er's routes which had not been served for a year and a half.66 The next
year the Board distinguished this case and, in disapproving a merger that
would have joined Southwest Airways, serving Oregon, with West Coast
Airlines, serving California, reaffirmed its policy of confining local carriers
to particular service areas in order to insulate them from trunk-type
pressures.
7
Following a CAB suggestion in the Southwest-West Coast Merger
Case,68 West Coast then sought to join with Empire, whose routes were
in the same general area and could easily be integrated. In approving the
merger 0 which brought West Coast into competition with United at
62 See Address by CAB Chairman Boyd, Air Transportation Institute, Wash-
ington, D.C., Nov. 18, 1960, p. 3.
611 C.A.B. 33 (1950).
6 4 In 1949, the Board also refused to allow common control of a feeder and a
large irregular carrier, emphasizing that the feeder experiment required control and
direction by airlines without the distraction of other carrier operations. Turner
Airlines, Inc., Transfer of Certificate, 10 C.A.B. 695 (1949).
65 Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246, 247 (1950) (dictum) ; see text
accompanying notes 51-52 srupra.
66 See Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, supra note 65, at 248-49; id. at 253-54
(concurring opinion).
67 Southwest-West Coast Merger Case, 14 C.A.B. 356 (1951); Gellman, supra
note 24, at 171.
68 14 C.A.B. at 358.
69 West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971 (1952).
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several points, 70 the Board departed from its express policy of avoiding
competition between feeders and trunklines.71 The Board was "per-
suaded" 72 by the Examiner's report of the probability of substantially
reduced expenses, new revenues, and less need for government subsidy.78
The most recent local service application was rejected on facts similar
to Southwest-West Coast.74 The parties served uncomplementary trade
areas on either side of the Chicago-Detroit line, and although a significant
reduction in subsidy could have been effected, the unprecedented size of
the resulting entity and the danger of long-haul route emphasis made
merger undesirable-in effect, the Board disapproved of one local service
carrier operating two feeder routes.
75
c. Summary
The pattern of Alaska merger decisions in the forties indicates that
the Board has encouraged mergers of small, marginal carriers when
duplication could be eliminated and economies secured; however, the
Board has disallowed mergers that would permit an already large and
profitable carrier to achieve overwhelming size and competitive advantage.
In the local service cases, the Board vacillated from its declared policy
of insulating feeder lines from trunkline competition and trunk-type pres-
sures and confining their operations to limited areas.
2. Small and Medium-Size Trunk Mergers
In Western Air Lines, Inc., Acquisition of Inland Airlines,76 two route
systems were brought together even though integration would not result.
77
The dissent objected on the ground that one of the public interest factors
was being ignored, but the Board found that poor management of opera-
tions, maintenance, personnel, and financing had contributed to Inland's
difficulties, and that Western's superior management would promote safer,
more efficient, and more economically sound operations on Inland's routes.
In the next acquisition case in this category, a purchase price higher
than that previously considered reasonable was allowed in order to foster
the development of an adequate airline system in New England.78 Simi-
70 See Empire Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B. 997 (1952).
"71 See FULDA, op. cit. mipra note 15, § 7.22, at 231.
72 15 C.A.B. at 976.
73 Id. at 979, 990.
74 North Central-Lake Central Acquisition Case, 25 C.A.B. 156 (1957), aff'd,
265 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959).
75 See Gellman, supra note 24, at 172-73.
76 4 C.A.B, 654 (1944).
77 Id. at 661.
78 Acquisition ot Mayflower Airlines, Inc., by Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B.
680, supplemental opinion, 6 C.A.B. 139 (1944). It was also significant that the ac-
quired carrier was in bankruptcy, had inadequate capital and obsolete equipment, and
served vacation areas on the Massachusetts coast that were inaccessible by surface
transportation.
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larly, a merger of National Airlines-with routes along the Atlantic sea-
board-and Caribbean Atlantic Airlines-running short-haul flights in
Puerto Rico--was disapproved because there could be no fusion of two
systems serving two different territories; "no development of an inte-
grated and coordinated air transportation system" would result.
79
In 1952, trunklines were reduced by two as a result of Braniff's
merger with Mid-Continent and Delta's merger with Chicago & Southern. 0
In both cases, although the Board emphasized the prospect of savings and
increased revenues, the effect on the transportation system must have re-
ceived tacit approval. Braniff's system ran north-south from Chicago to
Texas and east-west from Memphis to Denver; Mid-Continent's routes
from the Twin Cities to New Orleans and Houston clearly complemented
Braniff's service. The Examiner found that through-plane service on
four routes would attract new traffic and revenue and reduce expenses by
$523,000.81 Competition would be only slightly diminished, with no serious
diversion from other carriers. Route integration in Delta-Chicago &
Southern was not so clear.82 Delta flew from Chicago to Miami and east-
west from Charleston, South Carolina to Ft. Worth; Chicago & Southern
ran north-south through the midwest. However, the systems were con-
tiguous at several points, and merger with Chicago & Southern could be
viewed as strengthening the hypotenuse of the Delta triangle. In any event,
"integration" and the "system" were hardly considered.11 The Board
found that merger would "augment" competition" 4 by providing new
one-plane service between many points with an attendant lowering of break-
even load factors, better utilization of equipment and personnel, increased
revenue, and reduced expense.
Shortly after the relatively easy approval of these two important mer-
gers, the application of a small trunkline to acquire one of the largest local
service carriers split the Board three to two in favor of approval.8, So
compelling were the factors of integration, improved service, and reduced
subsidy that the majority was willing to deviate from the general policy
of maintaining the independence of local service carriers; actually, the
difference in classification in this case was largely semantic because of the
unusual degree of economic, operational, and geographical similarity be-
tween the two carriers.8 6
79 National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control Case, 6 C.A.B. 671, 676 (1946). The
Board also disapproved of the terms of the agreement.
s0 Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708 (1952); Delta-Chicago &
Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952). The labor conditions attached to the
latter merger were approved in Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
811 5 C.A.B. at 726-34.
82 In opposing the merger, Eastern foresaw a "sprawling network of noninte-
grated routes." 16 C.A.B. at 678.
83 But see id. at 689-92 (Examiner's Report).
84Id. at 685.




Thus, the Board seems to have welcomed mergers which enlarged
small trunklines as long as some integration, improved service, or econ-
omies could be effected without extreme anticompetitive or diversionary
results. A more deliberate, hesitant approach is evident in cases involv-
ing the Big Four-United, American, TWA, and Eastern.
3. Big Four Mergers
The Board's policy of strengthening smaller trunks springs from its
recognition that the route structure of the Big Four enables them to exploit
major long-haul markets with low-fare service and dominate the industry
8 7
The Board early formulated, in United Air Lines Transport Corp.-
Acquisition of Western Air Express Corp., the doctrine of a "reason-
ably balanced system of air transportation in every section of the
country" to prevent United'i acquisition of Western in 1940.88 United
had major east-west transcontinental routes; to have permitted it to swal-
low the only independent north-south trunkline on the west coast would
have virtually eliminated all important competition, leaving one carrier with
an overwhelming degree of control over western air transportation. In
addition, an alternative solution to one of the problems which had prompted
the merger request was available-equipment interchange agreements were
approved to avoid inconvenient change of planes by sleeper passengersPm
In United-Western, the Board indicated that although size alone is
not determinative, "concentration of ownership and control . . . is fatal
to the operation of a competitive economy." " Such fatal concentration
was not found in Acquisition of Marquette Airlines by TWA, in which a
transcontinental carrier was permitted to absorb a smal carrier flying be-
tween Detroit and St. Louis.9 1 The monopoly proviso of section 408 was
narrowly construed; monopoly was defined as one carrier on a route, and
restraint on competition or jeopardy to another carrier was prohibited only
insofar as one or both followed from the creation of a monopoly.92 The
Board found that improved service and development of traffic potential
accorded with the public interestY3
Apparently in American Airlines, Inc.-Acquisition of Mid-Continent
Airlines, forebodings of undesirable concentration caused the Board to
87 The Board has attempted to fortify the smaller trunks through route awards
and modifications. See Southwest-Northeast Service Case, 22 C.A.B. 52, 56 (1955)
(quoted in note 23 supra).
88 1 C.A.A. 739, 750 (1940).
89 Id. at 742.
90 Id. at 750.
912 C.A.B. 1, 9, supplemental opinions, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940), 3 C.A.B. 111
(1941).
92 See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
93 For an unusual case in which improved service and better equipment utiliza-
tion were achieved, with practically no effect on competition, by agreement nearly
tantamount to acquisition, see United Air Lines, Inc., Operation of Catalina Air
Transport, 6 C.A.B. 1041 (1946).
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broaden its reading of the monopoly proviso.94 Denial of the application
was based primarily on the merger's effect on the "system"; annexation by
the largest domestic air carrier whose routes stretched diagonally cross-
country of an uncomplementary north-south system would lack the neces-
sary integration and would facilitate diversion from American's com-
petitors of connecting traffic originating from Mid-Continent's flights. The
Board assured American that its size did not preclude merger and that
the present denial was not intended to prevent further expansion of Amer-
ican's system; 9 5 however, the Board specified that size and competitive
position must be considered, and that American-already the largest air-
line-would enjoy enormous competitive advantage merely because of its
size and wide geographical scope.9 6
Ten years later, Eastern's acquisition of Colonial was approved 97
in order to eliminate Colonial's dependence upon subsidy, although the
Board did not attempt to distinguish Arnerican-Mid-Continent in which
the prospect of subsidy reduction was held not-to be controlling.9 8 It is
perhaps significant that Eastern was smaller than American and Colonial
smaller than Mid-Continent. The Board found that Colonial could not be
self-sufficient 99 but could be successfully integrated with Eastern. Colonial's
routes from Canada to New York, Washington, and Bermuda coalesced
easily with Eastern's system extending from the northeast to Texas,
Louisiana, Florida, and Puerto Rico.
The most recent merger involving one of the Big Four-approved by
the Board in 1961-was that of United and Capital. 10 The only alterna-
tive to merger with United was Capital's collapse. Although United gained
a monopoly in nineteen markets by absorbing the fifth largest trunkline
and became the largest domestic air carrier, 119 markets would have lost
competitive service had Capital failed without any transfer of its route
certificates.101 Capital's extreme situation derived from its total inability
94 7 C.A.B. 365 (1946).
95 Id. at 379.
96 Id. at 377-78. Compare the subsequent approval of Mid-Continent's merger
with Braniff, notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.9 7 The CAB first gave its approval in 1954; merger was denied, however, by
the President, whose approval is required when an international air route is involved.
See Eastern-Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B. 453, 781 (1954). After a
finding that illegal control of Colonial by Eastern had been terminated, Eastern-
Colonial Control Case, 20 C.A.B. 629 (1955), the merger was finally approved, not-
withstanding Eastern's prior violation of the act. Colonial-Eastern Acquisition Case,
23 C.A.B. 500 (1956).
V8 See 18 C.A.B. at 782; SCHWARTZ, FREE ENTERPRISE: AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TION 167-68 (2d ed. 1959) ; Gelman, The Regulation of Competition in U.S. Domes-
tic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 25 J. Am L. AND COM.
148, 169 (1958).
199 See 18 C.A.B. at 784.
100 United-Capital Merger Case, IA Av. L. REP. 21,132 (CAB April 3, 1961),
aff'd sub nom. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 303 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
See generally Comment, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 851 (1962).
101 See id. at 871. Unlike the Board, the court of appeals found it unnecessary
to invoke the "failing business doctrine." Compare United-Capital Merger Case,
supra note 100, 21,132, at 14440-42, with Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, supra
note 100, at 401-02.
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to finance the purchase of competitive equipment.10 2 Intervening airlines,
"frankly combating the possibility of a new and powerful competitor in
place of a weak, partially moribund one," 1 0 3 urged the Board to inquire
into all possible alternatives; the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that the CAB had properly limited the issues before
it and was not required to launch "a reexamination of the route structure in
the whole of the eastern half of the country." 104
Past merger cases involving one of the Big Four seem to indicate that
an application by two of the Big Four is not the type that the Board sought
to elicit by its recent broad suggestions of merger. In any event, it is
doubtful that merger of American and Eastern could be approved without
a reexamination of the entire route structure-the type of examination held
to be unnecessary in United-Capital.
III. THE AmERICAN-EASTERN MERGER CASE
A. Background
The over-optimism of management in equipping and seeking expan-
sion, the eagerness of the Board to grant competitive route awards and ex-
tensions, and the service demands of the public have probably all con-
tributed to the airline industry's major problem--oversupply. 10 5  When
in 1961 the trunklines produced more than 29 billion revenue passenger
miles' 06 but suffered losses of over $30 million,10 7 matchmaldng efforts
mushroomed. Early in 1962, most major airlines were contemplating
merger; a Continental and National application was being prepared based
on the prospect of better utilization of jet equipment by leveling seasonal
variations, although there would be little elimination of duplication or
reduction of competition. The application was withdrawn after the Amer-
ican-Eastern proposal was announced. Having lost $5,400,000 in 1961,
Eastern sought to link its north-south systems (Chicago-Cleveland-Boston-
New York-Washington-Bermuda-Miami-Puerto Rico) to American's prof-
itable east-west lines.
In hearings before the Examiner, American and Eastern have painted
a dark picture of the industry and their own problems. Aggregate in-
vestment return has dropped from 11.6% in 1955 to 1.4% in 1961, whereas
the Board has found that a return of 10.5% is necessary for trunkline
102 See Brief of Capital Airlines, Inc. to Assoc. Chief Examiner, United-Capital
Merger Case, supra note 100.
103 303 F.2d at 399.
104 Ibid.
105 See Address by CAB Chairman Boyd, Connecticut General Symposium, Hart-
ford, Conn., Nov. 3, 1961, p. 2 [hereinafter cited as Boyd, Connecticut Address].
106 Id. at 3.
107 Time, Feb. 2, 1962, p. 59. In the first half of 1962, the nation's eleven trunk
airlines lost 52 million dollars because of too many costly jets and too few pas-
sengers. Time, Aug. 17, 1962, p. 70.
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operation. s0 8 Eastern has stressed the intrinsic weakness of its route
system which has extreme seasonal variations and one of the shortest aver-
age passenger hauls in the industry, which has been accentuated by the
demands of jet financing, and which imaginative and vigorous management
has not been able to overcome.10 9 The CAB's Bureau of Economic Regu-
lation (the Bureau) and the justice Department concede overproduction,
but they view 1960-61 as a recession period during which Eastern had
two "bad years." "o
B. The Merger Trend
The trend toward merger as a cure for poor profit ratios is not con-
fined to the airlines; banks and railroads are also seeking to consolidate.
Commercial banks claim that merger is necessary to enable them to meet
outside competition from mutual savings institutions, savings and loan
associations, finance companies, insurance companies, credit unions, com-
mercial paper dealers, government-created lenders, and do-it-yourself cor-
porate financing."' Although the banking industry is highly regulated, it
has no specific antitrust exemption, and the Justice Department has been
particularly zealous in opposing the bank merger movement."12
In the railroad industry, the ICC is swamped with merger cases and
anticipates more applications in 1963.11 Six of these are of major sig-
nificance, and one--the Pennsylvania-New York Central merger-would
create such a concentration of economic power that Senator Kefauver has
proposed "stop-gap" legislation to prevent ICC approval of any large
merger before 1964.114 Railmen contend that a series of mergers is needed
to establish a few large systems in each section of the country to eliminate
duplication and secure economical operation; that coordinating agreements
are not feasible; that railroads do not significantly compete with each other
but with other forms of transportation; that the alternatives to merger are
extinction or nationalization.
108 Trial Brief of American Airlines, Inc. and Eastern Airlines, Inc., pp. 6-8,
American-Eastern Merger Case, No. 13355, CAB, May 7, 1962 [hereinafter cited as
American and Eastern Trial Brief].
109 Id. at 36-38.
110 See Brief of Bureau of Economic Regulation, p. 18a; Brief of United States,
p. 47, American-Eastern Merger Case, supra note 108 [hereinafter cited as Bureau
Brief; U.S. Brief].
Ill See The Bankers" Battle, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 16, 1962, p. 10, cols. 5-6.
112 See generally Note, 75 HARV. L. REv. 756 (1962); Funk, Antitrust Legisla-
tion Affecting Bank Mergers, 75 BANKING L.J. 369 (1958). There appears to be
considerable disagreement between the Justice Department and banking authorities
over proper antitrust controls. See, e.g., Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 1962, p. 1,
col. 2. The Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. H, 1960), can
be read as an attempt to remove antitrust considerations from bank merger decisions.
See H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1960.
113 See The Pennsy-Central Merger, Forbes, Feb. 1, 1962, pp. 26-27; A Merger
Scoreboard, Time, Aug. 17, 1962, pp. 70-71; Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Aug. 13,
1962, p. 23, col. 5.
114 See N.Y. Times, April 4, 1962, p. 64, col. 3.
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The airlines, whose major traffic growth has been at the expense of
the railroads, have not yet taken up the railman's cry of "merge or die,"
but many are adopting the railroad goal of paring down to a few giant
systems. Indeed, the Justice Department has characterized the American-
Eastern proposal as introducing that goal into the air transport industry.115
C. The Precedential Value of Past Merger Decisions
Never before have two of the Big Four sought to join routes and
resources. The American-Eastern combination would become the nation's
largest air carrier and fourth largest common carrier, uniting nearly
$1,000,000,000 of assets and over $700,000,000 of yearly operating reve-
nues, and dominating both east-west and north-south air travel 116 with
200,000 miles of pooled routes.
117
On the map, the American-Eastern proposal closely resembles the
route link-up in the recent U-nited-Capital Merger Case,"18 and will pre-
sumably create the same integration and service advantages. But approval
in United-Capital was explicitly predicated on the need to prevent the com-
plete collapse of the Capital system, whereas Eastern is in no danger of
imminent collapse. Eastern has, therefore, cited and relied on the many
mergers in which resulting economies were crucial factors leading to ap-
proval; yet the vast size and scope of the proposed combination cannot
be disregarded, particularly when the Board has disapproved past mergers
because of undue concentration and the likelihood of competitive imbalance.
The Alaska-Cordova merger, for example, was rejected because it would
enlarge a system which was already the giant of the area."" The earlier
attempt by transcontinental United to acquire a major north-south west
coast line was thwarted because United would have then dominated western
air travel.120 Of course, the most striking precedent is the Board's dis-
approval of American's 1946 plan to acquire Mid-Continent.12 ' Although
it denied that size alone was ground for disapproval, clearly the Board
115 See U.S. Brief, p. 1:
The merger application before the Board in this proceeding is admitted by
the merger parties to constitute an open invitation to the Board to endorse
a policy of radical restructuring of the air transportation system of the
United States. The instant merger, say the applicants, should be but the
first step in a series of airline mergers which should ultimately reduce sub-
stantially the number of domestic air transport companies.
See the citation to the "lesson of the railroads" in Brief of American Airlines, Inc.,
p. 8, American-Eastern Merger Case, No. 13355, CAB, July 31, 1962, [hereinafter
cited as American Brief].
116 See Forbes, Feb. 1, 1962, p. 15; Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Jan. 24,
1962, p. 1, col. 5.
117 News Release, Rep. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Antitrust Subcomm. of House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 1962.
118 Compare Time Magazine, Feb. 2, 1962, p. 59, with Examiner's Initial De-
cision, United-Capital Merger Case, No. 11699, CAB, p. 83.
119 See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
120 See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
121 See notes 94-96 supra and accompanying text.
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envisioned that too much concentration and competitive advantage would
be derived from bigness alone if American were permitted to move north-
south through the center of the nation.
Probably each of the "concentration" cases can be distinguished.
American will not become the lone giant of domestic air travel that Alaska
would have been in its region in 1944. And a north-south extension for
American down the eastern seaboard will leave much more competition
than would have existed on the west coast had United been permitted to
absorb Western in 1940. In addition, Eastern's routes are more com-
plementary, offering more integration advantages than did Mid-Continent's
in 1946. Nevertheless, these distinctions cannot totally dispel the basic
argument that overwhelming size and geographical reach not only distort
an otherwise balanced system but place all other carriers at a competitive
disadvantage. The potential air passenger is greatly swayed by more
advertising of more flights over more routes to more destinations. Thus,
American and Eastern can obtain approval only-by persuading the Board
that the considerations expressed sixteen years ago in American-Mid-
Continent are no longer compelling because of changed circumstances.
D. Labor Protection, Efficiency, Economy, and Integration
After announcing their intention to merge, American and Eastern
publicized the proposal on the basis of projected economies: complementary
peak seasons would permit more effective use of fewer aircraft; savings
of over $50,000,000 a year would result from the elimination of overlapping
routes and duplicating ticket counters, hangars, and other facilities at
thirty common points; rising fares would be checked by a reduction in
capital requirements of $75,000,000; although initially there would be
somewhat fewer jobs, the creation of a more profitable airline would ulti-
mately increase employment.1
22
The parties have attempted to substantiate these claims in hearings
before the Examiner. Savings of over $100,000,000 in capital expenditures
were forecasted because of a diminished need for aircraft and parts result-
ing from complementary seasonal traffic peaks, fleet and route integration,
and the elimination of overlapping services.123 Also predicted were savings
of over $54,000,000 annually at 1965 levels in expenses for depreciation
and interest, electronic data processing, advertising, flying hours, rentals
and utilities, and personnel.124 But the Bureau has warned that projected
cost savings may not materialize since the merged carrier probably will
expand service and require additional aircraft,2 5 and expected economies
122 See, e.g., Joint Statement of Presidents of American and Eastern Airlines,
Jan. 23, 1962; Time, Feb. 2, 1962, p. 59; Why Airlines Are in Trouble, U.S. News &
World Report, Feb. 19, 1962, pp. 74-78.
123 American and Eastern Trial Brief, pp. 24-27.
124Id. at 27-32; Brief of Eastern Air Lines, Inc., pp. 15-29, American-Eastern
Merger Case, No. 13355, CAB, July 31, 1962 [hereinafter cited as Eastern Brief].
12 5 Bureau Brief, pp. 21-24.
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will be partially offset by "costs arising from the complicated process of
combining the systems." 126 Generally, however, the Bureau, Justice De-
partment, and intervening carriers concede that savings are likely to result
but oppose the merger because of its impact on competition, other carriers,
and the structure of the industry.
E. Competition and Bigness
According to American and Eastern, the salutary effects of competi-
tion are too costly. But overcapacity, the airlines' major problem, is not
necessarily the result of too much competition; managerial miscalculation
is at least partially to blame. Thus, elimination of competition between
thirty common points of travel is of serious concern to the Board and to
Congress.
The merging parties seek to divert attention from the Big Four to the
"Sheltered Four"--Braniff, Western, Delta, and Continental-which they
allege are more profitable because they remain "substantially sheltered
from competition." 127 On the other hand, they contend that the proposed
merger would not violate the monopoly proviso under the Board definition
of one carrier on a route. 2 8 In fact, the asserted "genius of the American-
Eastern merger, combining a basically north-south carrier with a basically
east-west carrier, lies in the facts that . . . the carriers are not com-
petitive except in markets where a reduction of the number of competitive
carriers is clearly desirable, and . . . because the routes generally lie at
right angles rather than being end-on, few new possibilities for effective
competition against existing services will be created." 129 The airlines
argue that "size per se is largely irrelevant," 130 and that bigness alone is
not the source of the economies they foresee and is not as significant in a
service industry as in an impersonal product industry.13 1 They also point
out that the merged carrier would account for less than one-quarter of
total operating revenues and assets of the certified route industry and less
than one-third of the total system revenues and assets of domestic trunk-
lines; that the merged carrier would not be "a giant among corporations
generally or even among transportation firms"; that "a high degree of
concentration has been characteristic of the air transport industry quite
without regard to the American-Eastern merger." 132
In one of his pro-merger addresses, Board Chairman Boyd noted a
general adaptation of the business community toward increased concentra-
tion, and that "it takes a big company to sustain the burden of keeping pace
126 Reply Brief of Bureau of Economic Regulation, August 13, 1962, p. 4.
127 American and Eastern Trial Brief, p. 43; American Brief, p. 25.
128 American Brief, pp. 41-42; Eastern Brief, pp. 46-49.
129 American and Eastern Trial Brief, p. 23.
130 Id. at 39.
131 See American Brief, p. 36.
132 American and Eastern Trial Brief, p. 39.
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when aircraft cost some 5 to 6 million dollars apiece." 33 However, he
then indicated that "mergers between the smaller airlines would seem to
provide a means of accommodating this fact in an orderly manner." 1
34
Although conceding that size is not necessarily a measure of profit-.
ability, the Bureau has argued that the combination would dominate the
trunkline industry and would be repugnant to the policies of the antitrust
laws 135 as well as the monopoly proviso.1 38  At the very least, therefore,
the American-Eastern application should force the Board to reconsider
and clarify its interpretation of the monopoly proviso of section 408(b).
F. Effect on the Industry
American and Eastern maintain that merger will strengthen the air
transportation system, although there is little support for this contention
in their briefs and exhibits. It is difficult to determine precisely how a
greater profit potential for American-Eastern will benefit the entire in-
dustry, except that a larger and more efficient carrier can provide enhanced
service to a greater number of passengers. The merged carrier would be
so powerful that remaining trunklines, in order to compete, would probably
be compelled to merge. Apparently it is this future system of a few super-
airlines resulting from a series of mergers which American and Eastern
regard as a stronger air transport structure; 137 in the American-Eastern
Trial Brief, the parties expressly urged mergers of other carriers.138 Thus,
the statement made in a 1955 study of airline competition that "no one
seriously contemplates or predicts that there will be a reduction to four or
five trunks" 139 is obviously now outdated. Indeed, this was the optimum
number of domestic trunklines proposed by the president of American
Airlines.'140
According to American, the merger will improve the credit rating of
the entire industry and increase public confidence; it will reduce excess
duplication and off-season capacity and cause only slight diversion from
other carriers. 141 The intervenors' arguments, says American, amount
'33 Before the Economic Club of Detroit, Jan. 8, 1962, p. 5.
134 Ibid.
135 See note 15 supra.
136 See Bureau Brief, pp. 45-65. See also U.S. Brief, pp. 3-15.
137 See U.S. Brief, p. 2:
[T]he instant merger proposal raises in dramatic fashion the question of
future direction which the nation's air transportation will take. The Board's
decision in this case may either serve as an invitation to, if not impose an
obligation upon other air carriers to undertake in self-defense, further merg-
ers and concentration in the airline industry, or constitute an unmistakable
reaffirmation of the basic competitive philosophy which has guided the Board
in . . . fostering a sound air transportation system ....
138 American and Eastern Trial Brief, p. 42.
139 Tipton & Gewirtz, The Effect of Regulated Competition on the Air Transport
Industry, 22 J. Amx L. & Com. 157, 171 (1955).
140 See Why Airlines are in Trouble, U.S. News & World Report, Feb. 19, 1962,
pp. 74, 76.
141 American Brief, p. 21.
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only to a vague claim that they will be overwhelmed by the size of the
merged carrier.142  Although it believes that the merger will create no
monopoly, American contends that the industry is already monopolistic in
the sense that there are few airlines, that the merger "would not affect this
basic structure of the industry," 148 and that, in any event, CAB regulation
would prevent monopolistic control of prices and service.
1'
The Bureau, however, has underscored the potential conversion of the
Big Four into a Big Two. After the American-Eastern merger, the Big
Two would control approximately 60% of domestic air transportation,
with the three biggest trunks accounting for 75%. American-Eastern itself
would carry 35% of the traffic. Whereas merger of smaller carriers would
promote competitive balance, the present merger would channel air trans-
portation into the hands of a few carriers.145 . The Bureau concludes:
"Based upon the evidentiary record . . . we see little opportunity for
making the required findings that would justify a structural reconstitution
of the basic pattern of domestic air service." 146
The competitive imbalance resulting from the American-Eastern
merger might frustrate the Board's efforts to arrive at a fair rate level.
Although a low fare level could be assimilated by the huge trunks, it might
seriously endanger efficiently operated smaller carriers. A level high
enough to satisfy the requirements of smaller and weaker trunks might
give disproportionate profits to the Big Two.147 The parties' solution to
this and similar problems is "the creation of stronger, more profitable
systems within the air transport industry." 148
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO MERGER
Although the Board has indicated a willingness to approve those
mergers it considers desirable,149 merger itself is an inefficient regulatory
technique, mainly because the Board is powerless to initiate merger trans-
actions. 8 0 Actually, government contracts guaranteeing mail payments
have undercut the need for merger among subsidized airlines by removing
the threat of bankruptcy. There is also an understandable disinclination
on the part of top executives to negotiate away their high-level positions
142 Id. at 22-23.
143 Id. at 35.
144 Id. at 36.
145 See Bureau Brief, pp. 6b-6d, 52-55.
146 Id. at 39.
147 Id. at 43-44 & n.67.
148 Joint Statement of Presidents of American and Eastern Airlines, Jan. 23,
1962.
149 CAVES, Am TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 444-45 (1962), warns the Board
not to encourage mergers.
150 See Boyd, Connecticut Address, p. 5. Chairman Boyd considered mergers
so necessary that he suggested that if the airlines do not take the initiative, the Board
should institute studies to develop detailed criteria for mergers and to recommend
specific carrier consolidations. Ibid.
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in separate companies. Therefore, voluntary merger is likely to be
prompted not by public interest considerations but by the possibility of
economic advantage.151 And not only is merger comparatively infrequent,
but it is a relatively drastic remedy for problems which may require
delicate adjustment.
If reduction of airline competition is a proper goal, route planning,
transfer, suspension, or revocation rather than carrier merger could be
utilized. Problems of high debt ratios, low profits, and inefficient use of
equipment might be better handled through managerial improvement and
product promotion, subsidy and rate adjustment, equipment and financing
regulation, or facilities-sharing and equipment-interchange agreements. 15
A. Rates, Subsidy, and Management
An obvious means of increasing revenue is to raise the overall fare
level; past experien1ce, however, has demonstrated that fare increases do
not increase airline profits 153 and certainly will hot expand traffic volume
to utilize unemployed facilities. It is sometimes asserted that rates are
now so high that air travel is a luxury service restricted mainly to expense-
account executives and tourists on once-in-a-lifetime excursions. Although
this assertion is less valid today than a decade ago, the airlines might never-
theless lower prices to attract more passengers. The American and Eastern
response is that although promotional fares might accelerate traffic growth,
a 300% increase in traffic in the past ten years has brought decreased
earnings. Furthermore, they contend that it is impossible to sell air travel
at a price competitive with the automobile.'15
A return to subsidy for unprofitable trunkline systems is probably
unacceptable; certainly the advocate of competition would not prefer this
remedy to merger. Yet short-haul feeders continue to enjoy subsidy,
and some extension of the local service subsidy principle, for example, to
the New England area in which trunkline service is primarily short-haul,
might be warranted.
One solution is more imaginative and efficient management, although
airline executives maintain that they are doing everything possible under
the circumstances. Eastern itself through progressive management has
instituted Air-Bus and Air-Shuttle services, hourly radio reports, and
many advertising and service innovations; nevertheless, profits have not
been forthcoming.
B. Equipping and Financing Regulation
Basically, it was the jet changeover that plunged the airlines into debt
and brought Capital to the point of imminent collapse. Overequipping in
151 See Zook, Recasting the Air Route Pattern by Airline Consolidations and
Mergers, 21 J. AiR L. & Com. 293, 311 (1954).
152 See, e.g., the suggestions in Bluestone, The Problem of Competition Among
Domestic Trunk Airlines, 21 J. AIR L. & Com. 50, 81 (1954).
153 See, e.g., American Brief, pp. 10-11.
154 American and Eastern Trial Brief, p. 16.
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response to rapid technological change has caused overcapacity with huge,
half-empty planes in the air; deficits have resulted from the short trips
flown by speedy, costly jets. And even though the Board has the respon-
sibility of ensuring the carriers a fair return on their invested capital, it has
no control over the largest single element of carrier investment-aircraft
purchases. 155 Since 1942, the Board has been requesting this needed
regulatory control over airline financing.156
C. Route Suspensions and Transfers
If route awards have been the cause of injurious competition, the Board
could resort to route suspension or revocation.' 57 According to Board
Chairman Boyd, "this will be done only if traffic does not warrant present
services and they cannot, be made economical through alternative
means." 158 He prefers route transfers and mergers to suspension, reserv-
ing suspension for cases in which "competition is excessive to the point of
ineconomy for the present and near future, and the carriers cannot and
will not take action to offset losses arising from duplicative services." 159
Unless compelled by particular circumstances, route suspension would
normally damage the affected carriers; similarly, extensive route transfer
is unlikely to the extent that it is unrealistic to expect an airline to cut back
on its route structure and significantly alter its competitive position.16°
Chairman Boyd has, however, persuasively summarized the advantages of
transfer:
Route transfers are the small retail size of route realignment of
which full mergers are the wholesale lots. Route transfers have
the same basic requirements as mergers. . . . However, they
can proceed on a much more selective basis. . . . Individual
route transfers can be much more accurately tailored to take
advantage of the benefits .... 161
D. Agreements Between Carriers
Many of the service, economy, and equipment-use gains accomplished
through merger could be achieved by sharing agreements between inde-
155 See Address by CAB Chairman Boyd, Economic Club of Detroit, Jan. 8,
1962, p. 3.
156 See 1942 CAB ANN. REP. 14; Trans World Airlines, Inc., Further Control
by Hughes Tool Co., 12 C.A.B. 192, 224 (1950); note 155 supra.
157 United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952) discusses the
Board's power of suspension. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 401(g), 402(f),
609, 72 Stat. 756, 758, 779, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(g), 1372(f), 1429 (1958).
15s Boyd, Connecticut Address, p. 4.
159 Ibid.
160 Yet Eastern has transferred several of its routes to local service carriers in
recent years. Bureau Brief, p. 16.
181 Boyd, Connecticut Address, p. 7. See also note 14 supra.
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pendent carriers.18 For example, equipment-interchange or through-
flight leasing arrangements have been used to eliminate the inconvenience
of changing planes.163 In 1947, Pan American and Panagra combined such
an agreement with one enabling Panagra to use Pan American's sales,
maintenance, and training facilities.'6 More recently, airplane exchange
between Pan American and National enabled each carrier to counterbalance
the effects of its seasonal traffic peaks and valleys.16 5 Even pooling ar-
rangements are lawful under the Act, although the Board has not en-
couraged them. 168
Although it may seem that joint-use agreements should be more at-
tractive than merger to airline executives,16 7 airmen generally dismiss these
agreements as impractical. American contends that excessive competition
impedes cooperation, and that overlapping traffic demands and conflicting
and changing requirements make airlines reluctant to commit themselves
to binding contracts. American also argues that past agreements have
almost always proved unsatisfactory, "lJArgely because separate man-
agements have all kinds of problems that make such joint ventures un-
wieldy." 18 The Bureau counters that the seasonal patterns of American
and Eastern are normal, recurring, and predictable, "ideal" for mutual
accommodation through leasing arrangements."
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the existence of various alternative solutions to airline prob-
lems, there is general agreement that merger affords the most effective
means of correcting excessive competition and capacity.1'70
In the past, the Board has favored limited competition, and there is no
indication at present of any change in policy.' 7 ' According to Chairman
Boyd, each carrier must be sufficiently large to command the financial re-
sources necessary to operate expensive jet fleets and prepare for the com-
ing era of supersonic transport; competitive balance among such carriers
is best achieved "with two carriers on a route between fairly large cities." 17-2
It has been urged, however, that the advantages of competition are too
162 Statutory provisions governing agreements are: Federal Aviation Act of
1958, §§404(a), 408(b), 412, 72 Stat. 760, 767, 770, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1374(a), 1378(b),
1382 (1958).
163 Subject to Board approval pursuant to §§ 408 and 412. See generally Winkel-
hake, Interchange Service Among the Airlines of the U.S., 22 J. Am L. & Com. 1, 26
(1955).
'
8 4 See Pan American-Panagra Agreement, 8 C.A.B. 50 (1947).
185 However, National continued to seek a more permanent solution through
merger. See Weak Medicine?, Forbes, Jan. 15, 1962, pp. 32-34. See also Capital
Airlines, Inc.-National Airlines, Inc., Interchange of Equipment, 10 C.A.B. 231
(1949), 10 C.A.B. 564 (1949).
186 See Bluestone, supra note 152, at 82.
167 See Boyd, Connecticut Address, p. 4.
168 American Brief, pp. 11, 12 & n.1.
169 Bureau Brief, pp. 29-30. See also U.S. Brief, p. 49 & n.91.
170 See, e.g., Boyd, Connecticut Address, p. 4; American Brief, p. 3 & n.1.
171 See Boyd, Connecticut Address, p. 6.
172 Id. at 7.
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expensive in a highly regulated industry.'73 But there are those who insist
that free enterprise principles should be relaxed only when regulatory ob-
jectives would otherwise be defeated. 17 4 In its search for an accommodat-
ing philosophy, the CAB has apparently adopted a pragmatic middle
ground. In a regulated service industry, the choice between beneficial
mergers and classic antitrust doctrines depends ultimately on which ap-
proach will better promote a vigorous transportation system.
On the basis of past merger decisions and recent statements by Board
members and counsel, a merger of two or three smaller trunklines which
would eliminate duplication but leave some competition is the type most
likely to be approved. Even with a series of such mergers, however, it is
doubtful that the industry will gain stability without a sharp and sus-
tained upturn in business. Two of the industry's Big Four have, therefore,
boldly challenged the Board's policy by proposing an unprecedented
merger.'
7 5
In hearings and briefs, American and Eastern have emphasized both
the economies that would result and Eastern's financial difficulties. Never-
theless, the savings, should they materialize, are not so attractive, nor
Eastern's situation, if more than temporary, so dire as to overshadow the
fundamental issues of bigness, concentration, competition, and systemic
balance. If the Board is not persuaded that merger will significantly benefit
the industry as well as the parties, a decision departing from past Board
policy and setting off a consolidation scramble is highly unlikely.
The CAB could easily reject the American-Eastern proposal with an
American-Mid-Continent-type opinion based on bigness and competitive
imbalance. But whether it approves or disapproves, the Board should not
decline the opportunity to redefine the monopoly proviso and clarify its
position on the desirable extent of competition and the role of the antitrust
laws in the regulation of air transportation. Also, the' Board cannot
properly approve the merger without undertaking a thorough reexamina-
tion of the national route structure and establishing guidelines for other
carriers in their then inevitable search for merger mates.
David H. Marion
173 See Bluestone, supra note 152, at 50-52.
174 See FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION
§ 14.2 (1961) ; note 15 supra.
175 The crucial nature of the issue presented by the American-Eastern applica-
tion is well expressed in the Bureau Brief, p. 37:
We are now at a crucial juncture. Major decision regarding the future of
air transportation must be made. The application for merger poses funda-
mental questions, and its resolution will determine, in large part, the devel-
opment of the domestic air service patterns. If the Board were to sanction
the combining of these two carriers, the disparity in size between each of
the dominant few and the more numerous but less powerful smaller trunks
would be more pronounced than at any other time since the enactment of the
regulatory legislation. Merger approval would, in effect, repudiate the prin-
ciple of balanced competitive service and nullify a policy that has been a tenet
of the decisional process. Such a sharp reversal would put an end to the
Board's long-standing policy which seeks an adjustment of the size disparity
between the larger and smaller trunks.
